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1  | INTRODUC TION
This paper examines home-care providers’ perception of commis-
sioning arrangements with local authorities in England, specifically 
considering how they experience contracting and the potential 
impact on home-care providers and service users. Two prominent 
features are drawn from policy and literature on commissioning to 
frame the study and provide a context for the empirical findings: (a) 
policy imperatives to increase home care for older people through 
the introduction of a market model in social care and (b) challenges 
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Abstract
In England, care to support people living at home is largely commissioned by local 
authorities (statutory organisations with responsibility for social care in specific lo-
calities) from non-statutory home-care providers (for-profit, not-for-profit, volun-
tary). This paper explores how managers of these services perceive commissioning 
arrangements and their impact on home-care providers, the care workforce and 
service users. Little formal research of providers’ experiences of working with local 
authorities in a commissioning model is available. A qualitative study employed semi-
structured telephone interviews with 20 managers of for-profit home-care providers 
from 10 selected local authority areas in England. Data were analysed using thematic 
analysis to identify main and subsidiary themes. Home-care providers reported oper-
ating in a complex and changeable partnership with commissioners, characterised by: 
(a) relationships ranging from transactional to collaborative, (b) providers expressing 
a strong sense of public service motivation, (c) commissioning practices that were 
complex to negotiate, time-consuming and overly prescriptive, (d) frequent changes 
in commissioning practices and a perceived lack of strategic planning, which were 
reported as contributing to uncertainty and tension for providers and confusion for 
service users. Attempting to operate a market model with tightly prescribed con-
tracts is likely to be unsustainable. An alternative approach based on a collaborative 
model of joint responsibility for providing home care is recommended drawing on a 
conceptual framework of principal–steward relationships in contracting.
K E Y W O R D S
care providers, commissioning practice, home-care, market model, qualitative study, relational 
contracting
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in implementing this approach within home-care services for older 
people. The paper uses principal–agent theory to extend our under-
standing of how providers and commissioners operate in a market 
model.
1.1 | Market model in managing home care for 
older people
Three decades ago, UK policy reforms in community care outlined 
a pledge to enable people to receive the care they required while 
remaining in their own home. The rationale for home care was based 
on evidence suggesting that enabling people to continue living in 
their own homes, with personalised support, could maintain their 
quality of life and offer a more affordable solution to the growth 
of care needs (Gridley, Brooks, & Glendinning, 2012; Harper, 2014). 
To achieve the ambition of maximising individuals’ independence, 
personalising care and minimising costs, an expansion of home-care 
services was essential (Cm849, 1989). A market model for sourcing 
and procuring home care from non-statutory providers in England 
was introduced to meet the anticipated growth in demand for home 
care (Cm849, 1989; Knapp, Hardy, & Forder, 2001). Adopting a mar-
ket model was based on the assumption that contracting home care 
from non-statutory providers (hereafter referred to as ‘home-care 
providers’) would assure gains in efficiency, cost and quality (Hardy 
& Wistow, 1997; Knapp et al., 2001). Initially this was conceived as a 
purchaser–provider process, followed by reforms that introduced a 
commissioner–provider model (Clarke, 2006). Thus, local authorities 
(organisations that are officially responsible for public services and 
facilities in a particular locality, including a statutory responsibility 
for social care) in England act as commissioners of services for the 
provision of social care, operating strategically as ‘service enablers’ 
rather than service providers (Bovaird, Dickinson, & Allen, 2012). 
Commissioning is part of local government strategic management 
for social care in England, consisting of a contracting process for se-
curing services for a locality. This is akin to the process of procure-
ment services in other countries. In England, commissioners oversee 
a contracting process for securing services, with responsibility for 
understanding the needs of service users across a specific locality, 
identifying priorities, sourcing home-care providers and monitor-
ing quality of provision using a broad framework, the commission-
ing cycle, to inform the process (Murray, 2011). Approaches have 
evolved within different localities, resulting in complex and challeng-
ing systems (Bovaird, Briggs, & Martin, 2014; Davies, et al., 2020) and 
considerable variation in the way the relationship between commis-
sioners and home-care providers is facilitated (Davies, et al., 2020). 
With the introduction of the Care Act (2014), a greater emphasis on 
their role of ‘shaping’ and ‘managing’ the market within localities was 
introduced.
Alongside adapting commissioning practice in response to policy 
championing the benefits of market approaches, local authorities 
have been managing unparalleled pressures on the social care sys-
tem with increasing unmet care needs, reduced spending by local 
authorities (Care Quality Commission, 2017; Glendinning, 2012) and 
a system that appears in ‘disarray’ according to some commentators 
(for example, Hudson, 2018). The complexity of trading in this con-
text for home-care providers, who operate in a market model often 
with a contractual arrangement with local authority commissioners, 
is known to be challenging (Bottery et al., 2018). The practicalities 
of negotiating contracts, costs and service delivery for vulnerable 
people are part of any care business practice, but complications aris-
ing from commissioners’ interpretation of being market shapers and 
managers as they assess locality needs, draw up specifications and 
aim to balance budgets, are potentially limitless. Contracts alone are 
complicated with contract types, such as ‘spot’, ‘block’ or ‘frame-
work’, varying in the advantages they confer and associated costs, 
whether for the commissioner or for the home-care provider (Knapp 
et al., 2001; Wilberforce et al., 2011). Contract arrangements vary, 
employing combinations of types of contracts (Chester, Hughes, & 
Challis, 2010). The responsibilities of local authorities also involves 
distributing personal budgets and overseeing the quality of home 
care for all budget holders, including for individuals who fund and 
source their own care. Social workers or ‘assessors’ play a critical 
role in mediating between commissioners and providers, assess-
ing individual need and co-ordinating care at home for vulnerable 
older people. It is interesting to note, that, in practice, personal bud-
gets have not been popular with older service users and constitute 
What is known about the topic and what this paper 
adds?
• Home care for older people is commissioned by local au-
thorities in England according to a market model
• employing complex contracting arrangements.
• Relationships between home-care providers and com-
missioners are often dominated by tight contracting 
processes and inflexible specifications.
• This study found that home-care providers navigate 
complicated and time-consuming contracting arrange-
ments with local authorities
• while operating with challenging financial
• workforce and client pressures.
• The relationship between providers of home care and 
commissioners is changing. There were examples of the 
contractual model
• with tightly prescribed specifications
• being replaced with a partnership characterised by pro-
viders being trusted to assess individual needs
• alter care arrangements and contribute to designing in-
novative solutions to local challenges.
• Some care providers and commissioners are finding 
ways to overcome a restrictive market model and ac-
tively developing a more trusting partnership based on a 
shared aim to deliver better quality care for older people
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a small part of commissioning arrangements (Baxter, Rabiee, & 
Glendinning, 2013), while demand for services from self-funders is 
difficult to anticipate (Baxter, Heavey, & Birks, 2019).
Severe financial pressures associated with a lengthy period of aus-
terity in England have compounded difficulties in provision of home 
care (Farnsworth & Irving, 2012; Glendinning, 2012; Power, 2014). 
Thus, home-care providers are working in a market model that has 
been difficult to implement and operating during a funding ‘crisis’ for 
social care (Care Quality Commission, 2017). Local authorities have 
reported relentless pressure to maintain provision while managing 
dwindling budgets (Bottery et al., 2018). Consequently, spending on 
home care and the nature of contracting processes are subject to 
variation between local authorities, resulting in home-care providers 
trading in an uncertain market that challenges their sustainability, 
particularly where their activities span local authority boundaries 
(Chester et al., 2010; Jefferson et al., 2017). Considerable instability 
is reflected in the ‘churn’ evident in the market, with 500 new agency 
registrations and 400 de-registrations each quarter (CQC, 2017). 
There are multiple challenges associated with this level of turnover, 
particularly given that new entrants to the market are unlikely to 
have the same service capacity initially as those they replace, and in-
deed, may exacerbate issues in recruiting and retaining care workers.
1.2 | Conceptual framework
Observing these challenges through the lens of agency theory 
(Lupia, 2001) can help to explain the mechanisms at work during the 
process of commissioning home-care provision and provide a con-
text for this study's empirical findings. Employing the concept of a 
principal–agent relationship reveals tensions between the players 
involved in sourcing and delivering home care (Van Slyke, 2006). The 
principal, in this case local authorities in England, contracts with an 
agent, a provider organisation, who takes on responsibility for pro-
viding a service on behalf of the principal. According to the theory, 
agents are motivated by their own interests, utilising their superior 
knowledge of the sector, in the form of asymmetric information 
(Van Slyke, 2006), to their own advantage. Principals, on the other 
hand, may control the budget to exert pressure by minimising costs 
to the detriment of the agent (Van Slyke, 2006). The theory sug-
gests that the principal–agent relationship is rarely characterised by 
interests or actions that align. The principal frequently loses agency, 
with arrangements that fail to achieve the desired outcomes. Loss of 
agency can be minimised, first, when the principal and agent share 
common interests and, second, when the principal is knowledgeable 
about the agents’ action (Lupia, 2001).
Evidence is emerging that the relationship between a provider 
and the commissioner can, in fact, be characterised by reciprocity 
and mutual support, rather than competition between public and 
private institutions (Van Slyke, 2006). Van Slyke (2006) suggests 
that commissioners and providers may operate using a ‘principal–
steward’ model where shared goals and trust are established as part 
of a long-term relationship (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Reported variation in commissioning practice (Chester et al., 2010; 
Davies et al., 2020) has prompted other researchers to visualise 
commissioning approaches as a continuum from a position prioritis-
ing cost minimisation to a partnership model (Rubery, Grimshaw, & 
Hebson, 2013). The term ‘commissioning orientation’ was adopted 
by Rubery et al. (2013) to convey the values and priorities of com-
missioners’ attitudes, with partnership considered a more effective 
orientation.
Home-care providers in England operate as agents within the 
commissioner–provider relationship, delivering an essential service 
in the social care system. However, their voice is rarely heard and 
little is known about how they respond to expectations from local 
authority commissioners and service users, while trading in a market 
context that is constrained by dwindling budgets, increasingly com-
plex cases and relentless demand.
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the process and 
impact of commissioning on home-care providers as agents in the 
home-care system. There are two aims: 
• To investigate the perspectives of home-care providers as part 
of the commissioning process for home care, examining the ex-
perience of contracting and delivering commissioned services for 
local authorities; and
• Explore the attitude of home-care providers to delivering com-
missioned services for older people.
2  | METHOD
2.1 | Study design
The research reported here was undertaken as part of a larger study, 
‘Commissioning Home Care for Older People’, to explore local au-
thority arrangements for commissioning home care for older people 
(redacted for review). Earlier stages of the project included a scoping 
review of the literature (Jasper et al., 2019), a national survey of local 
authority commissioning arrangements (Davies et al., 2020) and a 
qualitative study of commissioners’ experiences (Davies et al., 2020). 
This paper reports findings from a qualitative study of home-care 
providers, using data from semi-structured telephone interviews 
with 20 home-care providers in England in 2018. Ethical approval 
for the research was given by an HRA Social Care Research Ethics 
Committee .
2.2 | Recruitment and participants
The selection of home-care providers for this study was a two-stage 
process. First, local authority areas were selected based on commis-
sioners’ responses to a national survey conducted in the first stage 
of the study (Davies et al., 2020). Local authorities in England were 
grouped reflecting their collective approach to commissioning based 
on responses relating to: contracting arrangements; frequency of 
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provider consultation; provider contribution to specifications; and 
the use of providers who subcontracted services as part of their 
responsibility for the local authority contract (Davies et al., 2020). 
Second, 10 local authority commissioners representing different 
ways of working were approached to participate in interviews. 
Concurrently, managers of home-care providers from these same 
10 local authority areas were invited to take part in the study via 
an email circulation of members of the United Kingdom Homecare 
Association (UKHCA). UKHCA is the professional association rep-
resenting 2000 providers from the for-profit, not-for-profit, vol-
untary and statutory organisations in the home-care sector in the 
United Kingdom. As a result, 23 managers from home-care providers 
contacted the researchers. Of these 23, one withdrew as they did 
not have any local authority contracts, one provided services for 
people with learning disability only and one was a duplicate re-
sponse. Each prospective participant received a study information 
leaflet explaining the purpose of the research, and an interview time 
was agreed directly with the manager.
2.3 | Data collection
Topic guides for semi-structured interviews were designed (Table 1) 
by the research team based on previous literature and knowledge of 
TA B L E  1   Home-care provider topic guide
Topics Interview questions
Background Tell me about the service you provide
a. Services provided
b. Client groups
c. Size/staff/number of hours provided
d. Organisation
- part of a national organisation
- a company working in just one area
Current arrangements Contractual arrangements
- What kind of contract do you have with the LA?
- Length of contract
- How is your contract arranged?
- What do you think about the arrangement?
Your service delivery
- How do commissioning arrangements influence your service delivery? [consider length of visits/costs/LA arranged 
or budget holder/self-funder]
Essential for commissioning
- What do you think is most important for successful commissioning? How does this affect care?
Implications of 
commissioning (staff)







What are the implications of the LA’s commissioning arrangements for services that people receive in your area?
- Quality of care
- Service user experience and outcomes
- Capacity in your organisation




 Thinking about other home-care providers in your area, how is your service influenced by other providers?
 
- Number in area
- Your relationship with other providers
- What difference does the collaboration or competition make to you provision?
Relationship with 
commissioner
How easy or difficult is it to work with your commissioners?
- How do you raise issues and concerns with commissioners?
- How are you involved in the commissioning process (meetings)? How useful are these?
- How does this contribute to the care that users receive?
- How does this contribute to sustainability of provision?
Local Authority 
Approach
How would you describe the strengths and weaknesses of your LA’s approach to commissioning?
What difference does commissioning make to the services that people receive in your area?
- Tell us about any developments (e.g. outcomes-based approach—ask what they mean by an outcomes-based 
approach)
- Impact on staff in care agencies
Regulations Thinking more generally, what impact would you say that legislation/regulatory arrangements have on your service?
General comments Is there anything else you would like to mention or add?
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the sector. These were trialled as part of two pilot interviews with 
home-care provider managers and changes made to the content and 
wording of the interview questions in response to their feedback. 
The questions were open-ended, offering opportunity for inter-
viewees to elaborate and explain their observations and experiences 
(Breakwell, 2006). Topic guides were designed to focus on managers’ 
experience of local authority commissioning and did not directly probe 
experience of working with individuals using personal budgets in the 
form of direct payments. Each interview took 40–60 min to complete. 
They were audio recorded, transcribed and coded using ATLAS.Ti 7.5 
software. The study conformed to ethical guidelines for telephone 
interviewing with informed consent gained verbally over the phone. 
This was then recorded formally on a consent form by the interviewer.
2.4 | Data analysis
A detailed thematic analysis of the interview transcripts was com-
pleted by two researchers (KD ED). Initially, the analysis was con-
ducted independently by each researcher and then codes and 
themes were agreed following discussion with the research team. 
Each researcher adopted a six-phase process to ensure the analysis 
was conducted systematically (Braun & Clark, 2006). The phases in-
volved familiarisation with the interviews by reading and re-reading 
the transcripts, generating codes to record summary features, iden-
tifying salient themes to categorise codes, reviewing the themes 
with the research team and an adviser from the provider association, 
defining the themes and interpreting findings according to relation-
ships evident between the themes.
3  | Findings
Twenty home-care managers operating in a wide variety of ar-
rangements contacted the research team to take part in the study 
(Table 2). Participants were recruited from each local authority 
targeted and predominantly represented small- and medium-sized 
for-profit providers (n = 16). Respondents represented both urban 
and rural localities. The majority operated in one local authority 
area but several had experience of commissioning with neigh-
bouring authorities. Interviews took place between August and 
October 2018.
TA B L E  2   Characteristics of the for-profit providers as described in their interviews
Size of for-profit 
providers
Staff numbers (at the time 
of interview)
Operating as a 
franchise
Type of service 
delivered
Providers’ description of 
main contract type
P1 Small–medium 35 No Domiciliary Trusted provider
P2 Small 20 Yes Re-ablement Spot
P3 Small–medium 101 No a  Complex range
P4 Small–medium 100 a  Domiciliary Dynamic purchase system 
framework
P5 Small–medium 58 No Health and social care Unspecified
P6 Small–medium 109 Yes Domiciliary Spot
P7 Small 40 a  Domiciliary Spot and framework
P8 Small 80 a  Domiciliary Framework/second-tier 
provider
P9 Small 25 No Domiciliary Spot
P10 Large 170 Yes Health and social care Framework/lead provider
P11 Small 40 Yes Health and social care Spot second tier
P12 Small 80 No Domiciliary Framework and spot
P13 Large 2,500 Yes Domiciliary Trusted provider 
framework and spot
P14 Small 20 No Health and social care Dynamic purchase system 
framework
P15 Small 60 No Domiciliary Framework
P16 Large 200 a  Domiciliary a 
P17 Large 170 Yes Domiciliary Framework/preferred 
provider
P18 Small–medium 150 Yes Domiciliary Framework
P19 Small–medium 55 Yes Health and Social care Spot
P20 Small–medium 60 Yes Health and Social care Spot
aMissing data. 
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3.1 | Providers’ perspectives of commissioning
Four themes were identified during the data analysis (Table 3). 
Themes 1 and 2 describe the interface between home-care providers 
(hereafter referred to as ‘providers’) and commissioners, and provid-
ers’ motivation and values. Themes 3 and 4 report the providers’ ex-
periences of commissioning arrangements. Each theme is presented 
together with illustrative quotations from the interviews with home-
care provider managers. Managers are denoted as P1-20 in the text.
3.2 | Theme 1: The relationship between 
providers and commissioners ranges from contractual 
to collaborative
(i) Distant or trusting relationships
Providers described their relationship with commissioners as criti-
cal to effective provision of care. They conveyed their experience 
of working with commissioners as relatively distant or trusting, fre-
quently giving examples of how the presence or absence of good 
relationships affected service users. Those relationships that were 
presented as good were characterised by the way providers were 
actively involved in reviewing care plans, reassessing needs and ad-
justing care. As P10 asserted in respect of individual service users, ‘a 
more inclusive relationship with the assessment and the ongoing review 
of that service (by the provider), from the start of that care journey to 
the end of it’ could help adjust the emphasis of care away from crisis 
management towards the prevention of emergencies. Occasionally, 
there were examples of well-established collaborative relationships 
with the commissioner that supported quality in service delivery:
They (commissioners) have always been very collab-
orative both with the provider individually and with 
providers as a group…..that helps with the standardisa-
tion of care delivery and it helps with the standardisa-
tion of best practice. P1
More frequently providers’ discourse expressed frustration with 
limited collaboration with commissioners, characterised as a distant 
relationship. Providers associated this with difficulties such as delays in 
instigating home care for service users, late payment of providers’ in-
voices and changeable care arrangements. At times, providers implied 
that their trust was undermined by a lack of understanding, apparently 
unexplained actions by commissioners and slow processes within the 
local authority. Although providers expressed an understanding of the 
difficulties that commissioners faced regarding financial constraints, 
their interactions with them had left some providers as perceiving col-
laboration as tokenistic, and feeling undervalued or even marginalised:
It's like they don't care. You write to them, no response. 
The job you do for them, they don't pay you. So the way 
I see them is like they are trying to just run you out of 
business, even though you are within the borough. P
(ii) Shared responsibility
A minority of providers reported relationships that enabled them to feel 
part of a collaborative partnership with commissioners. These were char-
acterised by a sense of shared responsibility for assessing individual care 
needs and solving problems. The implications of working more closely 
with commissioners, and their nominated assessors, such as social work-
ers, were expressed as improving the quality of home care for individual 
service users. These collaborative relationships were characterised by 
increased levels of trust between the providers and commissioners, with 
providers permitted to make amendments to individual care plans and re-
spond to changes in service user needs, without necessarily having to seek 
authorisation from commissioners. This was also recognised as improving 
the timeliness of service provision and ensuring providers felt valued:
The difference now is we've got everyone in one place, 
we've got everyone in a hub. So, whereas before, you 
would phone a social worker, she would be in a totally 
different area in a different building than, say, the as-
sessor, she would then be in a totally different building 
than CCG, they would be in a totally different building 
to what commissioning was, and you just spent all day 
phoning around. P5
3.3 | Theme 2: The motivations and values of home-
care providers
(i) Motivations: driven by altruistic or business imperatives
Most interviewees spontaneously referred to altruistic values un-
derpinning their business model, as exemplified by P11, ‘You don't do 
TA B L E  3   Summary of themes
Main theme Subthemes
Theme 1: The relationship 
between providers and 
commissioners ranges 
from contractual to 
collaborative
(i) Distant or trusting relationships
(ii) Shared responsibilities
Theme 2: The motivations 
and values of home-care 
providers
(i) Motivation: driven by altruistic 
imperatives or business imperatives
(ii) Valuing the care role and staff 
delivering home care
Theme 3: Commissioning 
practices are complex to 
negotiate
(i) Contracting arrangements were 
complex and time-consuming to set up
(ii) Operating competitively while also 
collaborating with other stakeholders
Theme 4: Frequent changes 
in commissioning practices 
contribute to uncertainty 
and tension
(i) Uncertainty and risk for home-care 
providers
(ii) Uncertainty and confusion for 
service users
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it for the money, you do it for the reward’. They explained their reasons 
for setting up businesses in care, referring to personal stories that 
had motivated their interest in joining the sector. Providers often 
expressed clearly formulated values that reflected a desire to pro-
vide the best care, with examples of business owners and manag-
ers who were driven by their experience of people with social care 
needs, either as experienced carers themselves or influenced by en-
counters with people in the community who need support
(ii) Valuing the care role and staff delivering home care
Participants referred to the importance of valuing care staff, often 
regretting the perception of caring jobs as unqualified and unskilled 
by the public, referred to as ‘the general disrespect of the service and 
the staff’ (P4). The ‘low pay/low status’ badge was thought to dis-
courage potential applicants to care services and recruitment and 
retention were taken as a permanent and ongoing challenge for 
managers. Providers perceived that they were a solitary voice in 
recognising the demands on their workforce and that care workers’ 
worth was not reflected in the commissioning arrangements, with 
an inevitable impact on the quality of care for service users. Many 
providers reported that social care was increasingly involving more 
complex aspects of healthcare, without this necessarily being rec-
ognised by commissioning practices. Providers also underlined that 
care workers were responsible for delivering care activities that 
depended on outstanding personal qualities as well as skills devel-
oped through frequent training and careful supervision, regretting 
the fact that care workers were often undervalued:
Gradually things have been passed down to a social 
care team….we are now delivering very complex care 
packages to very vulnerable people….We're dealing 
with controlled drugs….doing waking nights for people 
who are end of life, so the responsibility of that role is 
immense, and we're doing that in somebody's home. P1
3.4 | Theme 3: Commissioning practices are 
complex for providers to negotiate
Provider managers described contracting arrangements as complex 
and time-consuming to set up and challenged by the tension be-
tween operating competitively while also collaborating with other 
stakeholders in the locality. Many believed the arrangements to 
provide services were constraining, exerting a negative effect on 
service users both in terms of tight contract requirements, lack of 
flexibility and wholesale changes in arrangements
(i) Contracting arrangements were complex and time-consuming to 
set up
Providers described procedures to gain contracts as lengthy and 
time-consuming, requiring multiple steps to prepare for and bid for 
a contract. They were perceived as focusing excessively on price 
rather than quality, described as a ‘race to the bottom’ (P10). In 
this case the local authority had evaluated the provider as offering 
good-quality home care but had negotiated a lower price. The pro-
vider clearly felt under pressure to reconsider what they could offer, 
and make adjustments to the contract, potentially compromising the 
quality of their service:
But we got a really high score on quality. So they loved 
the operational practice, the checks that we do, the 
behaviours, the quality aspects. We were the highest 
scoring provider. But this local authority then said to 
us… we really want to work with you guys but the rate 
that you submitted is higher than we can budget for. 
P10
Those navigating online systems with technical language and mul-
tiple steps in order to submit a tender, incurred costs in chasing and 
securing contracts with local authorities, ‘There's a hell of a lot that went 
into that to be honest with you.’ P17.
A few providers offered services to several local authority areas 
which entailed adopting different systems and meeting different 
expectations with variations in contract types, processes and tar-
iffs. There were examples where systems were awkward to use for 
providers, lacking transparency and appearing full of ‘ifs and buts 
and maybes’ (P14) creating uncertainty for business organisation. 
For example, a daily process of ‘bidding’ for individual cases (com-
missioning at the level of the service user, reflecting a spot contract 
arrangement) often left providers unable to plan core activities such 
as schedules for staff. These were time-consuming to oversee and 
added to costs for providers. Furthermore, the logistics of managing 
minute-by-minute billing, as practiced by some authorities (but not 
all) and the implications for paid carers were also raised as an unsus-
tainable practice for a business and their workforce:
Carers would go in, carry out the intimate personal 
care, which might take 15 min, for example, and then 
husband says, ‘oh thanks, dear, yeah, you can go now, 
I don't want you to do anymore’, and then…so we 
would only get paid for 15 min of that…So, it doesn't 
take a genius to work out that that's not a sustainable 
model sort of in the long term. P4
There were many different types of contract, such as frame-
work, dynamic frameworks, spot contracts and tiered services. The 
impact of different contract types on their businesses was rarely 
discussed and there appeared to no preferences for a specific type 
of contract. However, providers were keen to have control over 
the individual cases they accepted to ensure that their business 
organisation was not compromised and indeed, opt out of cases 
they deemed were unsuitable for their staff relating to skills and 
staff configuration. There were examples where the location of 
visits wasted time for care workers and contributed to inefficient 
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working practices related to unnecessary travel. Furthermore, 
managers expressed a desire to have flexibility about the kind of 
care they provided and how they supported their service users, 
for example, avoiding 15-min visits, that limited the level of care 
they could offer:
If you are a spot provider at least we have the choice, 
shall we say, of the package that are offered. Once 
you're on a framework they obviously will offer you 
the work and they will challenge you if you don't pick 
up work. P
(ii) Operating competitively while also collaborating with other 
stakeholders
Competition between providers for clientele in the state-funded 
sector was not a strong feature in providers’ discourse, with their 
comments suggesting that this focussed on a desire to be the best in 
the area, to stand out in terms of reputation and client recommen-
dations, rather than competing between each other for customers. 
There was also competition between providers for recruiting and 
retaining staff, with most providers mentioning incentives and ben-
efits that they believed helped them maintain their workforce. In 
spite of their efforts to retain staff, providers observed that staff 
would look for better opportunities with other care companies, de-
scribed as ‘job hopping’, or indeed leaving the care sector for less 
stressful employment in other settings. Competition between pro-
viders contributed to setting boundaries about the way individual 
businesses operated to gain the best market position.
There's collaboration in terms of shared ideas or shared 
concerns, blah de blah. In the field of practice there's…
it's quite…you know, I'm not going to tell them what 
we're doing, I'm not going to tell them what we're pay-
ing because we're all after the same staff. P4
3.5 | Theme 4: Frequent changes in commissioning 
practices contribute to uncertainty and tension 
The data showed that providers experienced changes in strategic 
commissioning that they considered threatened their sustainabil-
ity. Discussions referred to changes in processes to gain contracts, 
uncertainties about workflow and inconsistency in local author-
ity decision-making, often seen as linked to limited planning and 
leadership
(i) Uncertainty and risks for home-care providers
Providers gave many examples of significant changes in contract 
arrangements involving wholesale reorganisation of commissioning 
arrangements. Frequently, providers reported that these appeared 
to lack direction, purpose or clarity, and were viewed as jeopardising 
the stability of provision both for their own business and the care 
provided to service users. On occasions these changes were wel-
comed by providers, but largely they came with costs, for example, 
impacting on providers’ time in responding to service users who 
were distressed about changes.
Occasionally there were examples of arrangements that were 
considered impossible to work with, for instance, one local author-
ity had appointed a preferred supplier who was then subcontracting 
to smaller agencies, using the incentive of ‘selling’ opportunities for 
private work. The provider manager considered this as ‘bizarre’ and 
unsustainable for maintaining their business:
What he did say was that if any private work came up, 
they would sell packages to people who wanted that 
private work. P19
Some providers concluded that commissioning lacked a clear stra-
tegic pathway in their local authority, observing first, a lack of forward 
planning in formulating and implementing new models of commissioning, 
second, limited operational expertise and third, inconsistency of staff 
managing the commissioning. One provider suggested that long-term 
planning had been absent for many years, ‘I think it was quite possibly lack 
of forward planning over a considerable period of years’ (P14). Others ob-
served that limited strategic planning was exacerbated by the financial 
constraints that local authorities now faced, as ‘they've been backed into 
such a tight corner that they kind of lose sight of the bigger picture’ (P16).
Another provider linked the lack of direction to society's attitude 
to social care, wherein society had accepted a ‘reactive’ approach to 
home care rather than a proactive outlook that could enable funding, 
planning and delivery of care to be more carefully aligned:
I’ve seen such a transition over 28 years, it's unbe-
lievable… we're being reactive to rather than proac-
tive and social care really needs a good look at it and 
somebody needs to make a decision that this is how it 
needs to be delivered, planned, and funded. P12
There were suggestions that the motives of commissioners in mak-
ing changes were only financially and politically driven, but the major-
ity of providers recognised that this was pervasive and unavoidable in 
the current circumstances. However, there was an assumption that this 
could not lead to genuine savings longer term as failure to implement 
new models of care or systems was endemic across the sector:
The model they're using has been used in other parts 
of the UK and it's failed every time. I think the selling 
point for the Council was it's cheaper. It's cheaper for 
them to run it that way. P8
Managing uncertainty created additional costs for businesses, not 
only financial costs, but also in terms of human resources and personal 
costs. They described using various methods to alleviate the costs, 
such as resourcing in-house training, rather than paying for external 
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trainers. The market was so tight for one provider that they had strug-
gled to make the business viable and were accepting considerable per-
sonal costs, in reducing their own salaries drawn from the business.
(ii) Uncertainty and confusion for service users
The implications of uncertainties and delays thought to be related 
to the lack of strategic leadership by commissioners permeated the 
system, primarily affecting the quality of care for service users, as 
illustrated by P2, referring to a recent example, ‘It's a very, very long 
process…It has a massive impact…because of all that wasn't set up cor-
rectly that client is now back in hospital’. Occasional examples were 
also cited involving changes in contracting arrangements instigated 
by strategic commissioners, in which contracts were changed or 
terminated without considering the operational impact on service 
users. Distressed service users looked to providers to resolve the 
confusion and offer reassurance, creating unplanned, and potentially 
unfunded, work for home care businesses:
So we had a lot of work to do with our distressed cli-
ents. They didn't want to lose the staff. They didn't 
want to lose the organisation. So it's a whole chunk 
of work in my opinion that didn't need to happen. It 
doesn't advantage the client, it disrupts the client, it 
gives them huge concerns. P18
4  | DISCUSSION
This paper documents the challenges and issues of home-care pro-
viders operating in a market model with local authorities in the 
English system of commissioning home care for older people. Their 
perspective gave a unique opportunity to investigate how the 
delivery of home care for older people is influenced by commis-
sioning practices. The findings revealed three salient features of 
providers’ experience. First, quality of service delivery depended 
on the type of contracting relationship with commissioners. The 
contracting relationship between commissioner and provider was 
mainly considered a distant and transactional arrangement by 
most providers, with relatively few describing a collaborative rela-
tionship involving working collectively to solve problems of service 
delivery. Second, home-care providers’ experience was shaped by 
their part in a complex system, involving multiple contributors, 
from professionals assessing home care users with complex needs 
through to administrators managing contracts. The involvement of 
different professions, teams and organisations leads to a slow and 
unresponsive system for those delivering day-to-day care. As the 
steps in the system may not be very clearly defined and change 
in response to many factors, this adversely affected both home 
care users and providers. Third, the findings revealed that provid-
ers’ attitude in this study to delivering commissioned services was 
motivated by a desire to provide the best care, underpinned by the 
values of compassion. However, providers felt their values could 
be undermined by commissioning practice that focused predomi-
nantly on costs, demanding that providers compromised and read-
justed their own practice in response to changes and constraints 
imposed by the commissioning context. This was considered to 
have a particular impact on developing the workforce in the care 
sector, with implications for recruitment and retention and the sta-
tus of care workers.
4.1 | The contracting relationship: distant, 
transactional contract or collaborative, problem-
solving partnership
The introduction of a market model for the delivery of public ser-
vices such as home care was intended to improve efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness (Knapp et al., 2001). Relationships between 
those undertaking planning, procuring, delivering and receiving 
care were expected to replicate a market system. It was evident 
that while the terminology used by providers reflected this, there 
were a variety of concepts employed with little evidence of a con-
sistency in their use. Analysis of the authority-specific interpreta-
tions of contracting was beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the 
conceptual framework of principal–agent theory (Van Slyke, 2006) 
has been employed to explore some of the overarching features of 
the contractual relationship between provider and commissioner. 
It is assumed that in a contracting relationship, agents (in this case 
providers) will readily exploit arrangements to their advantage, 
such that principals (local authorities, the strategic commission-
ers) need to use burdensome monitoring to maintain oversight 
of detailed contracts. The relationship between commissioners 
and providers in a US context evolved over time, changing from 
a principal–agent to a principal–steward model in the context of 
non-profit care organisations (Van Slyke, 2006). This is also evi-
dent in the current study with regard to commissioning arrange-
ments for individual service users in the English context employing 
for-profit home-care providers. There were examples of providers 
moving towards collaboration, characterised by providers being 
trusted to assess individual needs, and alter care arrangements. 
However, changing to a principal–steward relationship was not 
universally reported. Many providers struggled with the contrac-
tual arrangements at the level of strategic commissioning, often 
referring to prescriptive service specifications, such as stipulating 
brief visits, or perceiving that hidden costs of delivering home care 
were constantly transferred to them. At the level of the individual 
and strategically, the role of commissioners operating in a market 
as a consumer and broker for older people with care needs has 
been difficult to establish as part of trusting co-working partner-
ship (Rodrigues & Glendinning, 2015). Providers find it hard to 
see commissioners proactively operating as market managers, as 
indicated in previous literature (Jasper et al., 2019; Rubery et al., 
2013), suggesting that commissioners may find this role difficult to 
understand and integrate with their own conception of monitoring 
service delivery.
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4.2 | Home-care providers operate in complex and 
confusing contracting arrangements with local 
authority commissioners
Previous studies report complex arrangements in strategic ser-
vice commissioning, poorly understood in wider society (Bottery 
et al., 2018), but intended to improve provision. However, these 
are frequently associated with additional costs and limitations 
(Rodrigues & Glendinning, 2015). At the level of the individual, the 
introduction of policy-driven initiatives, such as personal budgets, 
has proven unpopular with older service users, such that local au-
thorities, as commissioners, may have to be seen as encouraging new 
approaches while remaining the primary purchaser of home care at 
an operational level (Wilberforce et al., 2011). More widely, the ‘gen-
eral bewilderment at the social care system’ reported by the public 
(Bottery et al., 2018) is exemplified in the descriptions of complex 
and changeable contracting arrangements in this study. Throughout 
the interviews there was a narrative of balancing complex demands 
and arrangements, in gaining and keeping contracts, fulfilling com-
missioner and service-user expectations, overseeing the work-
force and managing finances. Furthermore, business security was 
frequently cited as a source of anxiety, with home-care managers 
acutely aware of the budget constraints that local authorities ex-
perienced and how these potentially threatened their own business 
(Angel, 2018).
Ongoing changes in how home care is sourced and pur-
chased has stimulated a wide array of arrangements for provision 
(Glendinning, 2012). Revisions for strategic commissioning, set out 
by the Department for Health (2017), extends the role of local au-
thorities, but continues to expect providers and commissioners to 
operate in a market model. The turnover in providers is thought to 
be related to financial pressures and changes in contracting prac-
tices (Glendinning, 2012). The results of this study suggest that op-
erating social care simply as a market cannot meet growing demands 
for home care. Contracting has not provided the answer to the 
problem of funding home care. Radical alternatives may be neces-
sary but may not be feasible within a typical market model (Bottery 
et al., 2018). The powerful narrative of a tense and uncertain rela-
tionship between providers and commissioners in this study does 
not support the notion of a principal–agent relationship typical of a 
market model. The evidence suggests that a more appropriate ex-
planatory model for the social care sector may be one employing 
principal–steward relationships.
4.3 | Motivations and values determining 
service delivery
For-profit home-care providers in the study expressed altruistic val-
ues in delivering services suggesting that more could be achieved 
by encouraging shared goals, usually considered as public service 
motivation, in contrast to competition and choice driving service 
delivery. This is not predicted by the conceptual framework of 
principal–agent theory, which assumes agents exploit their position 
as providers, for their own gain. However, the revised conceptual 
model of principal–steward (Van Slyke, 2006) theorises that moti-
vation for both the principal and steward is determined by shared 
goals. In this case, the goal of delivering good-quality home care rep-
resents an aspiration for both providers and commissioners.
In the current model of care, home-care providers are respon-
sible for improving quality for service users and championing good 
terms and conditions for paid carers, whether stimulated by commis-
sioners’ specifications or determined independently from contract-
ing demands. While providers expressed a practical drive to ensure 
the system of delivering home care works efficiently, there was also 
a powerful narrative of endeavouring to make a difference, to con-
tribute to society. They cited values, such as compassionate care for 
vulnerable people and respecting staff who deliver care. Accounts 
were often linked to accepting additional costs for the business, 
tolerating uncertainty and enduring personal burdens in order to 
provide care. In the context of complicated systems and intractable 
problems of providing sufficient high-quality home care, providers, 
as non-statutory for-profit providers, expressed a strong sense of 
public service motivation in spite of working in a market model of 
contracting. Indeed, at times they found they were championing the 
needs of clients in a context where commissioners appeared to be 
dominated by the principles of value for money rather than public 
service motivation. The presence of public service motivation in pri-
vate companies, as reported by managers in this study, indicates a 
predisposition to work collectively for the benefit of service users. 
Such motivation may be instrumental to achieving personalised 
care and supporting the shift from ‘time and task’ activities to out-
come-focused care. The prominence of such values suggests there 
is room for a balancing, or indeed a rebalancing, of priorities in the 
delivery of home care, focusing more fully on individual needs, and 
reducing the prominence of efficiency and cost-effectiveness as key 
drivers (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015).
Scandinavian countries have sought in recent years to capital-
ise on public service motivation in their care workforce by profes-
sionalising the carer role (Moberg, Blomqvist, & Winblad, 2018). In 
doing so, care workers can achieve greater personal development, 
autonomy and control over work tasks (Abbott, 1988; APPG for 
Social Care, 2019; Evetts, 1999). This is consistent with the assump-
tions of stewardship theory, that increasing responsibility and thus 
motivation leads to higher levels of performance as well as satis-
faction with work (Van Slyke, 2006). There is conflicting evidence 
as to whether auditing and other bureaucratic-laden processes are 
detrimental to professionalisation (Moberg et al., 2018). The evi-
dence from this study indicates that commissioning arrangements 
compound the devaluing of the care worker role in England. This was 
not described as a deliberate ploy, but an inevitable consequence of 
contract specifications focused on driving costs down and working 
within a dwindling budget. It echoes previous research which has 
reported low budgets decreasing provider ability to offer employees 
attractive terms and conditions, inevitably impacting upon quality 
(Netten, Jones, & Sandhu, 2007; Netten, Williams, & Darton, 2005). 
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Providers valued the home care worker role and expressed concern 
that the role was generally undervalued. This was considered as a 
barrier to recruitment and retention. Moreover, they believed that 
valuing the care role, and indeed professionalisation of the role, may 
act as a buffer to staff turnover; and recent evidence has reported 
that for care workers who held a relevant social care qualification, 
lower turnover was prevalent in comparison to those who did not 
(Skills for Care, 2018).
This paper has presented new insights into home-care providers’ 
perspectives of operating in a commissioning model. It has drawn on 
a rich data set generated through in-depth interviews with managers 
of home-care provider businesses. There are, however, possible limita-
tions in the study. First, providers were selected in specific localities 
through a partnership between the research team and UKHCA. This 
was based on the profile of local authorities identified from a national 
survey. Localities were excluded if they had not responded to it. Home-
care providers who were not the members of UKHCA were therefore 
excluded. Not-for-profit and voluntary providers were not represented 
among those who volunteered to take part and it may be that this re-
flects the particular composition of providers contracting with local au-
thorities in the chosen localities rather than differences in willingness 
to participate. Those who participated in the study were self-selecting 
as volunteers and willing to be interviewed. This may have excluded 
those struggling to maintain successful contracts with local authorities. 
While this is important in learning from the findings, investigating the 
experience of poorly performing businesses would demand a different 
study design. The second limitation concerns the limited information 
regarding the stage of the contracting process home-care providers 
were in, potentially restricting the interpretation of the implications of 
contract arrangements. Third, issues of social desirability bias, whereby 
interviewees may respond in ways that reflect well on themselves and 
their organisations, need to be considered in interpreting the findings. 
This was partly mitigated by probing interviewees and interpretation of 
the findings, together with assuring anonymity in the reporting of find-
ings. Finally, in adopting the principal–steward conceptual model, orig-
inally based on relationships with non-profit care organisations, there 
may be limitations for interpreting the way commissioning operates 
with for-profit businesses. Nevertheless, the study revealed consid-
erable detail and depth from providers’ involvement as commissioning 
partners, which can be usefully considered alongside the perspectives 
of commissioners in a companion paper (redacted).
5  | CONCLUSION
Non-statutory providers now play an essential role in the provision 
of home care in England, managed through complex contracting ar-
rangements that tend to be rigid and inflexible. This paper presents 
evidence from the providers’ perspective revealing a consensus 
that the commissioning process is difficult to navigate, restrictive 
and time-consuming. Where the relationship between providers 
and commissioners has changed and operates as a collaborative 
partnership, commissioning practice tends to focus on developing 
services rather than delivering rigid contracts. The findings from 
this study, together with the suppositions from principal–steward 
theory, should motivate policy-makers to reconsider the merits of 
tightly prescribed, closed contracts for commissioning home care. 
Adopting a more open contract, together with encouraging a rela-
tional approach nurturing the intrinsic motivation of providers, ap-
pears to be pivotal to effective commissioning in the future. This 
could afford opportunities to find jointly agreed solutions to intrac-
table challenges, such as commissioning for outcomes and recruiting 
care workers. To develop a relational approach, commissioners and 
providers will need to find ways to overcome the restrictions of a 
market model and develop a clearer understanding of the hallmarks 
of a trusting, collaborative partnership.
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